

Docket No.: GB920010007US1 (7161-224U)

PATENT

**IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES**

In re Application of	:	Customer Number: 46320
	:	
Paul ABBOT	:	Confirmation Number: 9940
	:	
Application No.: 10/046,058	:	Group Art Unit: 2134
	:	
Filed: January 10, 2002	:	Examiner: C. Brown
	:	
For: METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR STORAGE OF SECURITY KEYS AND CERTIFICATES		

REPLY BRIEF

Mail Stop Appeal Brief - Patents
Commissioner For Patents
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, VA 22313-1450

Sir:

This Reply Brief is submitted under 37 C.F.R. § 41.41 in response to the EXAMINER'S ANSWER dated August 16, 2007.

The Examiner's response to Appellant's arguments submitted in the Appeal Brief of June 1, 2007, raises additional issues and underscores the factual and legal shortcomings in the Examiner's rejection. In response, Appellant relies upon the arguments presented in the Appeal Brief of June 1, 2007, and the arguments set forth below.

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2 On pages 4-6 of the Second Appeal Brief, Appellant presented arguments that the
3 Examiner's asserted motivation to modify Kausik in view of Bahls would not have led to the
4 claimed invention. Specifically, one having ordinary skill in the art would not have looked to
5 fragment entities in the form of a key since keys are very small compared to the size of storage
6 that existed at the time of the invention. In response to these arguments, the Examiner initially
7 asserted the following in the paragraph spanning pages 8 and 9 of the Examiner's Answer:

8 The appellant in forming a stance against the present rejection has cited to portions of
9 Bahls, which state that it is not necessary to fragment a data object if the data object is smaller
10 than the available storage capacity of the working storage. The examiner asserts, however, that at
11 the time of the cited art of Bahls, circa 1995, storage in many devices especially those envisioned
12 in this combination such as PDA devices and other small portable electronics contained very small
13 memory that was shared between multiple applications. Bahls teaches that the working storage
14 represents a finite amount of memory (Bahls Col 1 lines 24-25), which is shared between multiple
15 applications. Bahls further recites that large data objects can render an application incapable of
16 performing their functions and that any data object that is larger than the working storage is
17 defined as a large data object for the purposes of the disclosure (Bahls Col 1 lines 36-47). At the
18 time of this disclosure the working storage for such a device as a PDA was clearly-within the
19 range that segmentation of an object the length of a key or even more so a certificate, which is
20 generally many times larger than a key since a certificate often contains a key and other
21 information such as a message digest, when shared with other applications would have required
22 being split up as set forth by the current combination and thus then would be a viable and
23 reasonable combination. (emphasis added)
24

25 The Examiner's response relies upon the assertion that the size of storage, at the time of
26 the invention, was much smaller for "PDA devices and other small portable electronics." Thus,
27 the Examiner is arguing that one having ordinary skill in the art could have applied the proposed
28 combination of Kausik and Bahls to devices with allegedly small memory (e.g., PDA devices
29 and other small portable electronics), in which case, as alleged by the Examiner, the
30 segmentation of the key could occur.

31
32 This analysis by the Examiner, however, lacks any factual context and essentially ignores
33 the teachings of Bahls and whether or not one having ordinary skill in the art would have applied

the teachings of Bahls to "PDA devices and other small portable electronics." The date relied upon by the Examiner (i.e., "circa 1995") is also improper since obviousness is determined "at the time the invention was made."¹ Thus, the Examiner should have considered the size of memory in PDA devices circa 2001-2002.

Regarding the facts, the Examiner has not presented any. The Examiner's allegations regarding what was the statement of the art "circa 1995" lacks any substance or factual support. Notwithstanding the Examiner's failure to present any facts regarding the state of the art in 1995, PDA devices at that time had memory size of approximately 2MB,² which is still considerably larger than the size of the key or certificate used at the time. Thus, Appellant respectfully submits that one having ordinary skill in the art in 1995 would not consider keys or certificates to be a type of data entity that would require segmentation in order to fit into storage.

Further analysis regarding Bahls' applicability to PDAs is found in the first full paragraph on page 9 of the Examiner's Answer and reproduced below:

The appellant's example of a system wherein the storage capacity is 40 gigabytes is an extremely narrow example of one embodiment and within such a case something such as a key may not be fragmented depending upon the size of the working storage, which Bahls states is of a variable size and not generally understood as being a hard drive, which is so large, but rather memory which is much more limited (Bahls Col 3 lines 24-25). Additionally, the intended embodiment of a device such as a PDA sets forth an embodiment which clearly would require segmentation and does not have vast amounts of storage capacity as cited by the appellant especially circa 1995, which is the time of the disclosure of Bahls. Therefore, when taking into consideration the state of devices present at the time of the disclosure of Bahls and the limited amount of memory available to those devices especially in the context of a PDA or other small portable device one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make such a combination and such a combination clearly would provide for splitting a key or certificate as disclosed by the appellant since the size of storage in these devices would have been very limited. (emphasis added)

¹ 35 U.S.C. § 103.

² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharp_Zaurus.

Appellant respectfully submits that the Examiner's analysis ignores whether or not the system of Bahls would be applicable to PDAs or other small portable electronics. Referring to column 1, lines 43-66, Bahls describes a need to have large data objects segmented and stored both in an application's working storage and in a shared storage medium. Also, the segments of the data objects stored in the shared storage medium could not be accessed by other applications. Referring to Fig. 1, Bahls illustrates separate applications 110, 118, 114, respectively, with individual working storage 112, 120, 116, and a shared queue 104.

Thus, based upon the teachings of Bahls, the architecture of Bahls' system includes at least two applications, each having respective working storage, and a shared queue, which constitutes additional storage. The Examiner's analysis, however, has failed to factually establish that any PDA or other small portable electronics device, either circa 1995, 2001-2002, or even today, has such an architecture. In fact, Appellant is unclear why a PDA or other small portable electronics device would employ such an architecture since this architecture is more applicable to large data processing systems with a central database (e.g., the shared queue) and client computers (e.g., the separate applications) than with a PDA in which only a single application is typically being executed at any given time.

For example, reference is made to column 5, lines 19-30, which describes a practical application of Bahls' system. In this passage, Bahls describes the system as a bank's transaction processing system. As can be readily envisaged, each of the separate applications 110, 118, 114 could represent separate bank offices that are requesting data objects from a central repository of information (e.g., the shared queue 104). In such a situation, a data object could be larger than

the capacity of the working storage of an individual application to handle the data object. In such an instance, the data object is segmented according to the teachings of Bahls.

In PDAs, however, only a single memory device is typically present and all applications have access to the same memory device. Moreover, there would be no "shared queue" separate from the working storage of the applications and no ability to segment the data object in and separate store segments of the data object in a working storage of the application and a "shared queue."

As noted above, Bahls is directed, in part, to preventing an application different than the original application from accessing a segmented portion of the data object. If at least two applications are not capable of accessing the same data object at the same time, then such a concern is not present. The Examiner, however, has failed to factually establish that PDAs or other small portable electronics device, at the time of the invention, could have multiple applications running at the same time that could access the same data object in a shared queue. Without this fact being factually established, the Examiner's analysis rests on nothing more than speculation.

Reference is also made to column 4, lines 17-26, which supports the notion that the applications 110, 114, 118 could be implemented using a different computer. However, where the applications 110, 114, 118 are on a single computer, Bahls teaches that the shared queue is implemented using another computer. Thus, the teachings of Bahls state that at least two

computers are used. Such a teaching is inconsistent with a PDA, which is not considered to be "at least two computers."

As to the underlined passage in the above-reproduced passage, reference is made to column 4, lines 31-48 of Bahls, which states that memory also includes a hard disk drive. Thus, the Examiner's assertion that the working storage is "not generally understood as being a hard drive" is incorrect.

The Examiner further asserted the following in the paragraph spanning pages 9 and 10 of the Examiner's Answer:

The recitation of a key being stored with the data object does not necessitate that the key is of the same size as the data object key, which is being split up, but as can be appreciated by one skilled in the art such a key is clearly capable of only being a few bits and can thus easily be stored with the split portions of the data object key or certificate.

This analysis by the Examiner again ignores the teachings of Bahls. As stated in column 3, lines 41-51, "a private key [is generated] that is unique among all data objects and applications." A key "being [only] a few bits" would not be considered capable of performing the above-described function. A key of only a few bits, specifically 3 bits, would only be able to uniquely identify 8 data objects. A key of 4 bits in length would only be able to uniquely identify 16 data objects. A key of 5 bits in length would only be able to uniquely identify 32 objects. Considering that even a simple address book could contain several hundred data objects, the Examiner's assertion that a key could only be a few bits does not reflect the teachings of Bahls which describes that the private key uniquely identifies both the data objects and applications. Thus, the Examiner's assertion that keys could only be a few bits long is both factually

1 unsupported and appears to have been created in hindsight by the Examiner to support the
2 Examiner's conclusion instead of being a fact that led to the Examiner's conclusion.

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4
5 Regarding Appellant's arguments as to claims 5, 16, and 27, the Examiner asserted the
6 following in the first full paragraph on page 10 of the Examiner's Answer:

7 The algorithm which determines the manner of splitting the data object of Bahls splits the
8 object based upon the size of the storage space, therefore the algorithm inherently determines the
9 storage location when splitting the object since it does so based upon the size of that location, thus
10 providing for The Algorithm performing both functions (Bahls Col 3 lines 24-25).

11
12 The Examiner's reliance on the doctrine of inherency is misplaced. Inherency may not be
13 established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a
14 given set of circumstances is not sufficient to establish inherency.³ To establish inherency, the
15 extrinsic evidence must make clear that the missing element must necessarily be present in the
16 thing described in the reference, and that the necessity of the feature's presence would be so
17 recognized by persons of ordinary skill.⁴ Furthermore, reference is made to ex parte Schriker,⁵
18 in which the Honorable Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences stated the following:

19 However, when an examiner relies on inherency, it is incumbent on the examiner to point to the
20 "page and line" of the prior art which justifies an inherency theory. Compare, In re Rijckaert, 9
21 F.3d 1531, 1533, 28 USPQ2d 1955, 1957 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (when the PTO asserts that there is an
22 explicit or implicit teaching or suggestion in the prior art, it must indicate where such a teaching or
23 suggestion appears in the prior art); In re Yates, 663 F.2d 1054, 107, 211 USPQ 1149, 1151
24 (CCPA 1981).

25
26 The Examiner did not discharge that burden of indicating where such a teaching appears in the
27 prior art. The Examiner's only citation is to column 3, lines 24-25 of Bahls, which states

³ In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1534, 28 USPQ2d 1955, 1957 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (reversed rejection because inherency was based on what would result due to optimization of conditions, not what was necessarily present in the prior art); In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581-82, 212 USPQ 323, 326 (CCPA 1981).

⁴ Finnegan Corp. v. ITC, 180 F.3d 1354, 51 USPQ2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 49 USPQ2d 1949, 1950-51 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Continental Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 20 USPQ 2d 1746 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Ex parte Levy, 17 USPQ2d 1461 (BPAI 1990).

⁵ 56 USPQ2d 1723, 1725 (BPAI 2000).

"[w]orking storages 112, 116, 120 may be the same size, or may be different sizes." How this cited passages relates to the Examiner's inherency assertion is entirely unclear. Thus, the Examiner has failed to establish that this limitation is inherently disclosed by Bahls.

Regarding Appellant's arguments as to claim 10, the Examiner asserted the following in the second full paragraph on page 10 of the Examiner's Answer:

The limitations of claim 10 as previously stated are old and well known within the art. The limitations are so well known that the disclosure of Bahls would not be concerned with explaining such a practice since one of ordinary skill would assume that any system of this nature performs those basic steps. The argument is not that it is obvious to try as set forth by the appellant but rather that this is an intrinsic part of any such system. (emphasis added)

The Examiner's argument that "this is an intrinsic part of any such system" appears to be an inherency argument in disguise. The Examiner, however, has provided no factual support for this Examiner's assertion or the Examiner's assertion that these "limitations are so well known that the disclosure of Bahls would not be concerned with explaining such a practice." In this regard, since the Examiner neglects to provide any factual support for these assertions, how can either Appellant or the Board properly evaluate the Examiner's claims?

For the reasons set forth in the Appeal Brief of June 1, 2007, and for those set forth herein, Appellant respectfully solicit the Honorable Board to reverse the Examiner's rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

To the extent necessary, a petition for an extension of time under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136 is hereby made. Please charge any shortage in fees due in connection with the filing of this paper, including extension of time fees, to Deposit Account 09-0461, and please credit any excess fees to such deposit account.

Date: October 16, 2007

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